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Student Loans in Bankruptcy and the “Undue Hardship”
Exception: Who Should Foot the Bill?
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental characteristics of the American dream is that
anyone should have the opportunity to get an education regardless of
their ability to pay the cost. The Federal Student Loan Program started as
a small allocation from the Department of Education to guarantee private
loans in those exceptional cases where a person wanted to attend college
but lacked the means to pay and the credit to obtain financing. Today, the
Federal Student Loan Program accounts for more than half of the
revenue produced in many higher educational institutions, making
student loans a staple of American education. In public universities, 62%
of students graduated with some kind of student debt; that number was
72% at private universities, and at the increasingly popular for-profit
universities—where tuition rates are among the highest in the nation—it
was a whopping 96%.1 Along with this rise in federal funding and
student loan guarantees, default rates skyrocketed as well, forcing many
to seek the protection of bankruptcy to avoid mounting debts.2 As it turns
out, the winning state for the most student debt is Arizona, home to the
largest for-profit educational institution, the University of Phoenix.3
It’s no secret: educational loans put students, as well as lenders, in a
precarious position. There is no guarantee of employment for the student
after graduation and no collateral for the lender. When the federal
government started guaranteeing student loans, these loans were treated
like any other kind of debt that could be discharged in bankruptcy. But in
1978, Congress began to withdraw such bankruptcy protection unless
repayment of the loan would present an “undue hardship.”4 This Act has
incurred substantial criticism over the years for apparently being at odds
with the overall goal of the Bankruptcy Code to provide a “fresh start”
1. The Inst. for Coll. Access & Success, Quick Facts About Student Debt, THE PROJECT ON
STUDENT DEBT (Jan. 2010), http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/File /Debt_Facts_and_Sources.pdf.
2. Hibah Yousuf, Student Loan Default Rate Creeps Higher, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 13,
2010,
11:47
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/13/pf/college
/student_loan_default_rate/index.htm.
3. Id.
4. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006)).
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for the unfortunate debtor.5 Lenders contend that because there is no
collateral to secure the loan, they need some kind of protection in order
to provide other students with lower interest rates. As a result, taxpayers
would ultimately have to foot the bill when the government ends up with
a large number of defaulted loans. With debtors, lenders, other students,
and taxpayers playing a game of musical chairs, someone is inevitably
going to end up without a chair and be unfairly forced to bear the cost.
The scholarly treatment of the “undue hardship” exception has been
largely negative; scholars have argued either for a more lenient reading
of § 523(a)(8) or for its repeal altogether.6 This Comment argues that
there are legitimate reasons in support of a strict, uniform interpretation
of “undue hardship” according to its plain language and the clear intent
of Congress. While one underlying purpose of bankruptcy law is to
provide a “fresh start” for certain qualified debtors, Congress has chosen
to diverge from that policy in dealing with student loans, and for good
reason. The results may be harsh, but they are not absurd. As more
debtors receive such harsh treatment in the courts, Congress may be
forced to reconsider the issue. As a result, Congress could restore equal
protection for student loan defaulters, just as the Bankruptcy Code does
for other debtors. Alternatively, Congress could preserve the current
approach but turn its attention to the universities themselves, requiring
them to truthfully educate prospective students about the risks of student
loans and the reality of employment prospects upon graduation.
Part II provides an overview of the bankruptcy system, the
development of student loans in the United States, and the policies
underlying § 523(a)(8) and its approach to student loans. Part III reviews
how various courts have interpreted and applied the “undue hardship”
exception in the student loan context. Part IV provides an analysis of
these approaches, arguing that a strict implementation of the “undue
hardship” exception is the best approach. Part V then offers a brief
conclusion.

5. See, e.g., Richard Fossey, “The Certainty of Hopelessness”: Are Courts Too Harsh
Toward Bankrupt Student Loan Debtors?, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 29, 33 (1997); B.J. Huey, Comment,
Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time Finally Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section
523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 89, 116 (2003).
6. See, e.g., Sarah Edstrom Smith, Should the Eighth Circuit Continue to Be the Loan
Ranger? A Look at the Totality of the Circumstances Test for Discharging Student Loans Under the
Undue Hardship Exception in Bankruptcy, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 616–18 (2006); Huey, supra
note 5.
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II. THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM AND STUDENT LOANS

In order to fully explain the reasons supporting a strict interpretation
of “undue hardship,” this Part will provide an overview of the
bankruptcy system, along with a brief history of the development of
student loans in the United States, followed by the policy considerations
underlying the enactment of § 523(a)(8) and its unique treatment of
student loans. Any argument on the subject of exceptions to discharge is
incomplete without a full understanding of the options available in
bankruptcy. In particular, it should be noted at the outset that a discharge
of debt is not always the debtor’s only goal in bankruptcy.7
A. Bankruptcy Law
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to establish
uniform bankruptcy laws.8 Congress has exercised this power to
establish a separate judicial department of the federal district courts to
administer the bankruptcy system.9 The first permanent legislation on
uniform bankruptcy laws was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.10 Since then,
there have been major reforms to the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, 1990,
1998, and 2005.11 As it stands today, the Bankruptcy Code offers the
financially troubled individual the option of obtaining relief from
creditors in the form of Chapter 7 liquidation12 or a Chapter 13
adjustment of debts for debtors who have adequate income to repay all or
part of the debts through a repayment plan.13 Under both chapters, the
goal of almost every debtor is typically the “discharge” of debts,14 which
enjoins any act by creditors to collect the discharged debt.15 While
discharge is most often the debtor’s goal, the creditor’s goal is typically
to obtain a denial of the debtor’s discharge altogether, or—even better—
an exception from discharge for that creditor’s particular claim on the
7. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. In Chapter 13 cases, for instance, the debtor’s
goal is not always to obtain a discharge, but to structure a repayment plan that the debtor can fulfill
while enjoying the benefits of the automatic stay against creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 151.
10. 30 Stat. 544.
11. See Huey, supra note 5, at 93–95.
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–727.
13. Id. §§ 1301–1330.
14. Id. §§ 727(a), 1328(a).
15. Id. § 524(a)(1)–(3); In re Olson, 38 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (holding that
a doctor’s refusal to provide medical services until pre-petition discharged debts were paid violated
the discharge injunction).
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debtor.
This Comment focuses on the exception provided in
§ 523(a)(8), which states:
(a) A discharge under . . . this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt—
(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s
dependents, for—
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded
in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or
(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit,
scholarship, or stipend; or
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan . . .
incurred by a debtor who is an individual . . . .16

To clarify, the debtor generally will receive a discharge of debts unless
any of his debts are listed in § 523(a). If a particular debt, such as an
educational loan, is listed in § 523(a), that debt is an “exception” to the
possibility of discharge and will have to be paid. The “undue hardship”
clause is therefore an exception to the student loan exception, in that if
the
debtor
can
show
that
repaying
the
debt
would impose an undue hardship, the debt will then be discharged like
all other debts generally.
The Supreme Court has stated that § 523(a)(8) is self-executing,
meaning that “[u]nless the debtor affirmatively secures a hardship
determination, the discharge order will not include a student loan
debt.”17 This brings up another point: discharge is not always the goal of
bankruptcy. A debtor who carries both educational debt and consumer
debt can first obtain a discharge of the consumer debt in a Chapter 7
liquidation within a matter of months.18 The student debt will survive
this bankruptcy, and then the debtor can more easily manage his student
loan in a Chapter 13 repayment plan over the course of three to five

16. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (emphasis added). A “qualified education loan” is defined under
the Internal Revenue Code as any education loan to pay expenses while a student is enrolled in at
least half the normal full-time student load; it does not include loans between family members or
loans made under an employment contract. 26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(1).
17. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 450 (2004).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)–(b).
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years.19
Analysis of any bankruptcy problem and, particularly a problem
arising in the educational loan context, begins with the two aims of the
bankruptcy system: 1) to provide “equality of distribution”20 to creditors
and 2) to give a “‘fresh start’” for the “‘honest but unfortunate
debtor.’”21 While the phrase “fresh start” does not show up in the
Bankruptcy Code, it is an accepted policy of the bankruptcy system and
the clear purpose underlying discharge in bankruptcy. 22 Commentators
often invoke this “fresh start” policy as a controlling and mandatory
standard by which bankruptcy law must be tailored.23 But Congress is
under no obligation, constitutional or otherwise, to enact uniform laws on
bankruptcy that operate under the “fresh start” policy, or any other
policy.24 Rather, Congress is free to structure bankruptcy law in any way
that may protect the needs of the poor, unfortunate debtor, or favor the
business interests of creditors. For better or worse, over the last thirty
years
Congress
has favored the latter in dealing with the problem of student debt
discharge.25
B. The Federal Student Loan Program
When the Soviet Union put Sputnik into orbit, Congress decided that
it was time to put America back in school. As a result, in 1958 it enacted
the National Defense Education Act, which established the predecessor
to the Perkins Loan Program and allowed students to obtain student loans
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a), (d). This method is often called a “Chapter 20” filing (Chapter 7
plus Chapter 13). The 2005 amendment in BAPCPA restricted the availability of this option by
placing timing restrictions between filings.
20. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 346 (1874).
21. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that the Bankruptcy Act “gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor . . .
a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt”)).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Fossey, supra note 5, at 33; Robert F. Salvin, Student Loans, Bankruptcy, and
the Fresh Start Policy: Must Debtors Be Impoverished to Discharge Educational Loans?, 71 TUL. L.
REV. 139, 173–78 (1996); Huey, supra note 5, at 93.
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.; In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 753 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
25. In 1978, Congress had conflicting information about how many students were actually
abusing the bankruptcy system to discharge student loans on the eve of lucrative careers, but
Congress nevertheless enacted § 523(a)(8). See Huey, supra note 5, at 98.
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from the government at five percent interest.26 Congress later established
a program in 1965 allowing the government to guarantee private loans,
which later was named the Stafford Loan Program.27 These loan
programs were originally open only to those individuals able to
demonstrate financial difficulty in paying for college, but in 1978,
Congress opened the door further and made federally guaranteed loans
available to virtually all students without regard to financial need.28
Because of this universal availability, maintaining the solvency of
the Federal Student Loan Program is vital to higher education. Robert C.
Cloud, Ed.D., identified two reasons why this is the case: “First, millions
of deserving students depend on federal loans to finance their educations.
Second, most institutions, both public and private, could not survive
financially without the revenue generated through the federal loan
program.”29 Thus, it is important that educational loans remain easy for
students to obtain. However, as long as financing remains the primary
revenue generator, universities will continue to raise their tuition.30 One
commentator described (with appropriate imagery) the situation as
follows: “Colleges ‘suddenly saw the government as this giant wobbling
teat just waiting to be sucked and started a spastic race towards Who
Could Charge the Most Ludicrous Tuition for Four Years . . . .’”31 These
practices have continued up to the present time. Today, the average cost
of tuition at public universities is over $7,000 per year, while private
universities charge, on average, over $27,000 per year.32 Off to the races
they went, and there is no sign that anyone is getting tired: universities
have consistently raised their tuition above the inflation rate for the last
thirty years.33 With such heavy dependence on the Federal Student Loan

26. Robert C. Cloud, When Does Repaying a Student Loan Become an Undue Hardship?,
185 EDUC. L. REP. 783, 786–87 (2004).
27. Id. at 787.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 788.
30. See, e.g., Kim Clark, College Tuition Prices Continue to Rise, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT,
Oct.
23,
2007,
http://www.usnews.com/education/paying-for-college/articles
/2007/10/23/college-tuition-prices-continue-to-rise.html; Editorial, Fees or Tuition, It’s Too Much,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/10 /opinion/la-ed-tuition-20101110.
31. Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences, 29
SW. U. L. REV. 501, 506 n.23 (2000) (quoting Ian William, The Indentured Class: Student Loans Are
Robbing Us of Our Future, THE PROVIDENCE PHOENIX, Sept. 20, 1996, at 8).
32. COLLEGE BOARD ADVOCACY & POLICY CENTER, TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
SERIES:
TRENDS
IN
COLLEGE
PRICING
2010
10
(2010),
available
at
http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/College_Pricing_2010.pdf.
33. Id. at 13.
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Program, and the general push for students to attend college, student debt
is here to stay.
C. Policy of the “Undue Hardship” Exception
There is much controversy today over the “undue hardship”
exception, a great deal of which is reflected in the historical debate in
Congress that occurred when it considered enacting § 523(a)(8). In 1978,
the same year that federal loans were opened to most middle class
Americans without the requirement that students demonstrate financial
need, Congress added the § 523(a)(8) “undue hardship” exception to the
Bankruptcy Code. This was a response to the fear that students might
take advantage of the bankruptcy system by incurring large amounts of
student debt, only to obtain a discharge of the debt on the eve of lucrative
careers.34 Proponents responded, however, that if the “undue hardship”
rule was repealed or interpreted too leniently, the Federal Student Loan
Program could collapse and lenders would refuse to loan to high-creditrisk students. The loss from defaults would fall on taxpayers. Other
student debtors would also bear the burden of defaults through higher
interest rates, and some students would not even be able to qualify for a
loan because of the credit risk.
Democratic Representative Allen E. Ertel, who advocated the
inclusion of § 523(a)(8), argued further: “At a time when political,
business, and social morality are major issues, it is dangerous to enact a
law that is almost specifically designed to encourage fraud.”35 Thus, it
does not matter whether the bankruptcy system is actually being abused
because educational debt is treated like any other debt; the real problem
lies in offering the temptation. Indeed, just because student debtors
historically have not taken advantage of the bankruptcy system does not
mean that they would not do so now if given the opportunity. Perhaps
such abuse has never existed precisely because Congress has never
afforded the broad population of students the opportunity to discharge
34. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 536–537 (1977).
35. Id. at 536–37 (“For example, as a student leaves college to find a job, that student would
have two options: (1) repay a substantial loan at a time when that student’s financial situation is
probably at its lowest, or (2) discharge the debt in bankruptcy, having received the benefit of a free
education. If student A elects to repay the loan, honoring the legal and moral obligation that was
incurred, he begins his career with a substantial debt and the accompanying financial pressure.
Meanwhile, student B (who chooses to declare bankruptcy) can begin with a clean slate and is free to
spend his initial earnings on other items. By combining the clean slate with the excellent credit
rating that accompanies a bankruptcy (since the discharge debtor cannot declare bankruptcy again
for six years), student B is rewarded for refusing to honor a legal obligation.”).

825

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/31/2013 3:50 PM

2011

student loans without a showing of “undue hardship.”
Moreover, proponents of the “undue hardship” provision argued that
a student loan is fundamentally distinct from other more traditional types
of loans. Lending in the student loan context is increasingly based on and
driven by risk. With a home loan, this risk is mitigated by the fact that
there is property securing the debt. But the student is not a typical debtor,
but rather a newcomer in society. She generally has no assets by which
any debt could be secured, and she is often a poor credit risk. The
education that the student seeks is not a transferable asset, and so the
student essentially mortgages the only thing possible: her future earnings
without the possibility of relief from bankruptcy. This trade-off,
proponents argue, is what allows students to obtain financing on such
relatively favorable terms.
Opponents in Congress pointed out that the empirical data did not
suggest that discharges of student loans in bankruptcy were a problem,
even if high default rates were problematic for the federal loan
program.36 In 1978, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) found
that the default rate on education loans was 18%, and of those 18%, only
about 3–4% received a discharge in bankruptcy.37 The GAO also found
that in most bankruptcy cases involving student debtors, the educational
loans accounted for only a part of the debtor’s total indebtedness,
demonstrating that most student debtors were in bankruptcy as a result of
“a true need for . . . relief rather than an abuse of the bankruptcy
system.”38 Moreover, they reasoned that “[t]reating students, all students,
as though they were suspected frauds and felons is no substitute for
improving the administration of the (student loan) program.”39 In sum,
opponents argued that the alleged abuse was more perceived than real,
possibly because of exaggeration by the media, which created public
concern that potentially devious students would take advantage of a
bankruptcy loophole.40
In the present debate today, commentators who oppose § 523(a)(8)
argue that the “undue hardship” rule is unnecessarily harsh, denying debt
relief to all but a few select debtors, and usually only to those with

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 133 (letter of comptroller general Elmer B. Staats).
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id.
See Huey, supra note 5, at 97 n.84 (citing Jean Seligman et al., Study Now, Pay Never,
NEWSWEEK, May 7, 1977, at 95).
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dependents and medical conditions that prevent gainful employment.41
At the same time, debtors with other kinds of debt are not laden with the
task of proving undue hardship. This problem is compounded because
courts have developed varying standards, and the subsequent lack of
uniformity prevents student debtors from knowing beforehand if they
might qualify for undue hardship.
Today, along with the ever-increasing cost of tuition, the student
loan default rate has risen as well. In a 2010 press release, U.S. Secretary
of Education Arne Duncan announced that the average default rate in
2008 was 7%, with public universities suffering a default rate of 6%;
private universities, 4%; and for-profit universities, 11.6%.42 Duncan
went on to say,
This data confirms what we already know: that many students are
struggling to pay back their student loans during very difficult
economic times. . . . While for-profit schools have profited and
prospered thanks to federal dollars, some of their students have not. Far
too many for-profit schools are saddling students with debt they cannot
afford in exchange for degrees and certificates they cannot use. This is
a disservice to students and taxpayers . . . .43

There are arguments that cut both ways, but in the end, Congress had
a legitimate reason for deviating from the “fresh start” policy that
generally guides bankruptcy law. That policy was the potential abuse that
could occur if students were allowed to discharge their educational loans
in bankruptcy the same way that other debts are discharged. Students
generally do not have the volume of assets that other debtors have, and a
student’s education cannot be liquidated like real or personal property in
order to satisfy the creditors’ claims. While many commentators have
criticized the enactment of § 523(a)(8) as a response to a merely
“perceived” problem rather than an actual one,44 Congress was probably
most concerned with the potential for abuse, perceived or actual, that
could undermine the Federal Student Loan Program, shift the costs of
defaults to the taxpayers, and burden future student borrowers with
higher interest rates and less favorable loan terms. These policies are
anything but obsolete today; if anything, there is an even stronger policy
41. See, e.g., id. at 115–18.
42. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Student Loan Default Rates Increase, (Sept. 13,
2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/student-loan-default-rates-increase-0.
43. Id.
44. E.g., Kurt Wiese, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy: The Bankruptcy Court Tests
of “Undue Hardship,” 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 446 (1984).
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supporting tighter standards on student loans in bankruptcy as tuition and
default rates increase.
Furthermore, even if a student cannot receive a discharge in
bankruptcy, this is not the end of the analysis—the student has other
remedies. First, the unavailability of discharge does not mean that the
student cannot still file a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 in
order to establish a repayment plan.45 Still, more remedies are available
to the student through federal programs that allow the student to repay,
such as “income-contingent repayment” and “extended repayment.”46
Finally, Congress shows little sign that it has any intention of
repealing the “undue hardship” exception in spite of strong opposition. A
review of the history of § 523(a)(8) is revealing on this point. When first
enacted in 1978, § 523(a)(8) provided that student loans were
dischargeable only in the first five years after becoming due. 47
Furthermore, education loans were excepted from discharge only in
Chapter 7 liquidation cases, not in Chapter 13 adjustment of debt cases.48
In 1990, Congress amended the “undue hardship” exception so that
educational loans could no longer be discharged in Chapter 13 cases.49 In
the same year, Congress extended the five-year exception period to seven
years.50 These amendments came at the precise time when student
borrowing began to increase at greater rates.51 In 1998, Congress
repealed the seven-year exceptions, forcing the financially troubled
student to prove undue hardship no matter how long it had been since the
time the loan became due.52 At this point, it was clear that this “pattern
of amendment represents an obvious tendency on the part of Congress to
tighten the gaps through which students could avoid loan repayment.”53
With the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (BAPCPA) overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress
had the opportunity to remove or restrict the application of § 523(a)(8),

45. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2006).
46. See Solutions for Borrowers Who Are Having Trouble Repaying Education Loans,
FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/troublerepayingdebt.phtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
47. Huey, supra note 5, at 100 (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-508, § 3007(b), 104 Stat. 1388–28 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a))).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Cloud, supra note 26, at 788.
52. Huey, supra note 5, at 101 (citing Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105–244, 112 Stat. 1837 (1998)).
53. Kapinos v. Graduate Loan Ctr., 243 B.R. 271, 276 (W.D. Va. 2000).
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but chose not to do so. In fact, it expanded the exception even further.
Prior to 2005, the “undue hardship” exception applied only to loans
“insured, or guaranteed by a government unit, or made under any
program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit
institution.”54 With the enactment of BAPCPA, Congress once again
amended § 523(a)(8) and brought within the ambit of the “undue
hardship” exception “any other education loan that is a qualified
education loan.”55 The direction of Congressional action in the last thirty
years with regards to educational loans has made abundantly clear
Congress’s intent that educational loans be discharged only in very
unusual circumstances.
III. COURT-MADE “UNDUE HARDSHIP” TESTS
Whatever the considerations that led Congress to adopt the “undue
hardship” exception, Congress left “undue hardship” undefined. As a
result, federal courts have come up with several different tests to
determine when an “undue hardship” exists. Some of the earliest
decisions over educational debt discharge first attempted a definitional
approach to “undue hardship” by looking at the dictionary definition of
“undue.”56 One district court concluded that “undue” meant
“inappropriate or unsuitable or not right and not extraordinary” and did
not require “exceptional circumstances.”57 This approach was shortlived, and unsurprisingly did nothing to clear up the confusion over what
constituted an “undue hardship.”58 Because of this confusion, courts
began to adopt more uniform standards to determine when an “undue
hardship” existed.
A. The Johnson Test: The Mechanical Approach
In the wake of the confusion left by the definitional approach to
“undue hardship,” the Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court in In re Johnson
set the first mechanical approach for interpreting “undue hardship.”59
The opinion first quoted a report of the Bankruptcy Commission from

54. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(i) (2000).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2006).
56. In re Johnson, No. 77-2033 TT, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *20 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1979) (citing In re Moore, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 791, 792 (W.D.N.Y. 1978)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at *21.
59. Id. at *21–23.
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1973 when the idea of an “undue hardship” exception was first
introduced:
In order to determine whether nondischargeability of the debt will
impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor, the rate and amount of his
future resources should be estimated reasonably in terms of ability to
obtain, retain, and continue employment and the rate of pay that can be
expected. Any unearned income or other wealth which the debtor can
be expected to receive should also be taken into account.60

The court created a test whereby the debtor’s past and future income
and expenses are compared to determine whether the debtor has the
ability to pay while maintaining a “minimal living standard.”61 The court
set forth a complicated list of factors to consider, such as rate of pay,
ability to obtain and retain employment, skills, sex (in cases where the
debtor is a woman trying to obtain employment), current employment
status, employment record, education, health, access to transportation,
and whether the debtor has dependents.62 Then the court adopted a twopart test for determining the amount of an individual’s expenses. First,
the court determines “what amount of monthly expenses is reasonable for
a ‘similarly situated hypothetical debtor.’”63 Second, the court adds to
this amount any “extraordinary expenses.”64 The court then identified
three factors to guide courts in determining whether the first prong is
satisfied.65 As should be obvious at this point, the mechanical aspect of
the Johnson test was rather complicated and difficult to apply. There are
multiple prongs with multiple factors, which themselves breed more
factors and more prongs, rendering the litigation too burdensome.66
However, the Johnson test became the predecessor to the Brunner test,
discussed in Subpart C below.
If the debtor was able to make it through the gauntlet of the
mechanical test, the court would then look to see if the debtor had made

60. Id. at *21–22 (quoting COMMUNICATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMISSION
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING A REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 140
n.17 (1973)).
61. Id. at *21–23.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The three factors are 1) marital status, 2) number of dependents, and 3) whether any
necessities are furnished in kind, or at reduced cost. Id. at *32.
66. Smith, supra note 6, at 616–18.
ON THE
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good faith efforts to repay the loan.67 In order to do this, the court
assesses whether the debtor was negligent or irresponsible in maximizing
income, minimizing expenses, and making efforts to obtain
employment.68 For instance, if the debtor had an opportunity to find a
residence at half the rent the debtor was currently paying, then the debtor
was negligent in minimizing living expenses.69 Moreover, if the debtor
failed to seek gainful employment, a court would likewise be justified in
denying the debtor’s discharge.70
Additionally (since the two-part test apparently was not enough), the
court added a third part: a policy analysis focusing on the amount of
educational debt, the percentage of the debtor’s total indebtedness, which
is composed of student loans, and the extent to which the debtor’s
education has enhanced earning capacity.71 Essentially, the court looks
to the motives of the debtor, asking why the debtor filed bankruptcy and
whether the debtor is trying to take advantage of the system.72 If a debtor
satisfies the mechanical test but fails the good faith test, the court may
grant a discharge based on the policy test.73
Naturally, the results of the Johnson test were harsh because too
many elements had to be proven, and the debtor largely carried the
burden of proof.74 Furthermore, the test is simply too convoluted to be of
any value to other courts, let alone to debtors who must know whether
they can satisfy the elements of the test.75
B. The Bryant Test: The Objective Approach
The same court (in a case involving the same party) developed a new
test eight years later in Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Education
67. In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *41.
68. Id. at *44–50.
69. Id. at *45.
70. Id. at *47.
71. Id. at *52. The court quoted from Bankruptcy Revision Hearings supporting such a policy
analysis that comported with the policies discussed above in Part II.B.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.; Huey, supra note 5, at 104.
75. Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 n.2
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (“In the leading case on this issue arising in this Court, In re Johnson, Chief
Judge Twardowski develops a comprehensive and thoughtful, but unfortunately complicated threepart progressive test, each level of which has numerous inquiries to be answered before proceeding
to the next level. While we find the Johnson Opinion very helpful in cataloging circumstances which
can be considered by courts in such matters, we respectfully decline to follow the Johnson test.”
(internal citation omitted)).
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Assistance Agency.76 In an attempt to “place the element of objectivity
into the process of decision-making in this area,”77 the court adopted a
test which first analyzes the income and resources of the debtor in
relation to the poverty guidelines.78 If the debtor’s income is below or
close to the poverty line a presumption of dischargeability arises.79
However, if the debtor’s income is substantially above the poverty line,
such a presumption is not warranted, although the debtor can still
demonstrate “unique” and “extraordinary” circumstances which should
nevertheless render the debt dischargeable.80 Like the court in Johnson,
the court in Bryant placed emphasis on the phrase “minimal standard of
living” as utilized in the Bankruptcy Commission Report.81 The court
recognized that “poverty level” and “minimal living standard” are
probably two different things.82 While it is unclear what exactly is meant
by “minimal standard of living,” the court felt that if a debtor was below
the “poverty level,” the debtor was certainly below the “minimal
standard of living.”83 For this reason, the court created an ipso facto
presumption that satisfying the “poverty level” test automatically
establishes “undue hardship.”84 In a further attempt to add objectivity to
the test, the court held that the federal poverty guidelines should be used
in making this determination.85 However, one problem remained: what is
meant by the phrase “substantially over” the poverty line? Unfortunately,
the court never adequately explained this.86 In analyzing whether
“unique” and “extraordinary” circumstances existed, the court looked to
the totality of the circumstances.87
The court conceded that although the test was harsh, § 523(a)(8)
applied only to debtors in Chapter 7 cases, and not those in Chapter 13
cases. This fact led the court to conclude that its “poverty line” test was

76. Id.
77. Id. at 915.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93–137 at 140, 141 app. 2 (1973)).
82. Id. at 916.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 918.
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not overly strict.88 Additionally, the court rejected any notion that the
motives of the debtor should be taken into consideration in determining
discharge.89
In applying the newly created test to Bryant, one of the debtors in the
case, the court found that even though the debtor did not satisfy the
poverty level test, he did satisfy the totality of the circumstances test, in
part because he was a recent law graduate who had failed to pass the bar
five times.90 The result comported with the policies underlying the
“undue hardship” exception, since originally Congress would have been
concerned about students’ ability to declare bankruptcy on the “eve of a
lucrative career.”91 Here, the unusual circumstances existed where a
debtor was not trying to take advantage of the bankruptcy system, but
rather was simply involved in a difficult situation that he was unable to
remedy. On the other hand, one could argue that the debtor should not
have been relieved of his burden when it was his decision to enter law
school and assume a large debt. Wasn’t this the risk that the debtor
undertook when he obtained the financing to attend school? In this way,
the totality of the circumstances test, as will be discussed below in Part
IV.D, is inappropriate because it does not comport with the legislative
intent of § 523(a)(8).92
C. The Brunner Test: The Majority Rule
The “undue hardship” test used by a majority of courts is derived
from the case of Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services
Corp.93 Instead of using a test comprised of alternative elements, the
district court developed a single three-part test, in which each element is
necessary to establish “undue hardship.” The debtor must prove that 1)
the debtor cannot, based on current income and expenses, maintain a

88. Id. at 917.
89. Id. at 915 n.2.(“[W]e disagree with the attachment of any significance to the factor set
forth in the first part of the Johnson ‘policy test,’ in which the court considers the amount and
percentage of student loan indebtedness to all of the debtor's indebtedness in the bankruptcy, in order
to determine whether the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy was to discharge the student loan. In
In re Gathright, we observed that avoiding the consequences of debts is normally the reason for
filing for bankruptcy and the fact that the Debtor seeks to discharge almost exclusively student loan
obligations in his bankruptcy should be irrelevant. We believe that this factor should likewise be
entirely irrelevant in a § 523(a)(8)(B) analysis.”).
90. Id. at 926.
91. In re Andresen, 232 B.R. 127, 130 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999).
92. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
93. 46 B.R. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d. Cir. 1987).
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“minimal standard of living” if forced to repay, 2) “additional
circumstances” exist indicating that the debtor’s current condition will
continue for a significant portion of the repayment period, and 3) the
debtor has made a “good faith” effort to repay the loan.94 In this case, the
debtor received a master’s degree in social work, incurring a total of
$9,000 in student debt, and then filed for bankruptcy about seven months
later.95 The debtor was unable to find work, had no dependents, and was
living primarily off of welfare for the four months prior to her
bankruptcy filing.96 She offered testimony from her therapist that she
suffered from depression due to her unemployment, but that she was still
able to work.97 Moreover, she had sent out over a hundred resumes to
employers in her field but was unsuccessful, as were many in her field in
the early 1980s.98 The court conceded that the debtor clearly did not
have the ability to repay her student loans and at the same time maintain
a minimal living standard.99 However, the debtor failed to show that her
circumstances would continue into the foreseeable future since she did
not have a “psychological impairment,”100 and was “apparently healthy,
presumably intelligent, and well-educated.”101
The debtor’s situation in Brunner is a typical one: the debtor is
usually able to show that paying off the debt while maintaining a
minimal living standard would be impossible.102 However, the debtor
will face a far more difficult task in proving that this inability to pay will
continue into the future. A bankruptcy judge in the same circuit that
decided Brunner stated that “dischargeability of student loans should be
based upon the certainty of hopelessness, not simply a present inability to
fulfill financial obligations.”103 This “certainty of hopelessness” standard
has been the staple of virtually all undue hardship analysis.104 But, as
94. Id. at 754–57.
95. Id. at 754.
96. Id. at 757.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The bankruptcy court judge found that the debtor did in fact have a psychological
impairment. See id. However, the district court determined this finding to be clearly erroneous since,
although the debtor may have suffered from depression, such a condition did not impair her ability to
work.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., In re Hinkle, 200 B.R. 690 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1996) (holding that a fifty-oneyear-old woman with a degree and a steady income was entitled to an “undue hardship” discharge).
103. Id. at 755 (quoting In re Briscoe, 16 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
104. Fossey, supra note 5, at 30 (citing Commonwealth State Educ. Assistance Auth. v.
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one commentator notes, it is “an almost impossible burden to
overcome.”105 The reason for this is that “[t]hose debtors who are in the
most dire need of relief—that is, those for whom repayment will
certainly impose an undue hardship—will likely lack the resources to
pursue such relief in the first instance.”106
D. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
Some courts have criticized the use of a mechanical test, such as the
Johnson or Brunner tests, and instead have adopted a “totality of the
circumstances” test. The Eighth Circuit adopted the totality of the
circumstances test in the case of Andrews v. South Dakota Loan
Assistance Corp. In this case, the court reasoned that all circumstances
surrounding the debtor’s situation should be considered, particularly
because the policy underlying bankruptcy relief is equity, which requires
more of an in-depth factual analysis than a purely legal one.107 Under
this test, a court is free to consider any fact that may bear on the debtor’s
case in addition to those already considered in the mechanical tests.108
Because of this freedom to consider any factor relevant to the debtor’s
case, commentators have praised the inherent flexibility of the test.109
One commentator argued, “As tuition rates continue to rise, students
continue to take out more student loans. . . . The test provides a look at
the debtor’s whole financial situation and still provides for the
Dillon, 189 B.R. 382 (W.D. Va. 1995); In re Coveney, 192 B.R. 140 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996); In re
Walcott, 185 B.R. 721 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1995); In re Garrett, 180 B.R. 358 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1995);
In re Mathews, 166 B.R. 940 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994)).
105. Huey, supra note 5, at 116.
106. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship
Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 191 (citing NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N,
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 212 (1997) (“It hardly is surprising that some courts see
few requests for hardship discharges of educational loans given the pitfalls of the undue hardship
standard. The borrowers most likely to prevail in many courts are those with the least possibility of
being able to litigate the question. The risk of losing is also high. Failure to meet the burden of proof
leaves the debtor with student loan debts and substantial litigation expenses.”)).
107. See Moorman v. Ky. Higher Educ. Assistance Auth., 44 B.R. 135, 137–38 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1984) (“‘Undue hardship’ is a concept so fraught with subjective elements that we must consider
the totality of a debtor's circumstances to confirm its presence or absence. . . . Our approach is not
intended to yield a general rule applicable to a broad class of cases, but remains as flexible and
adaptable as the concept of equity itself. We are able to say only that the whole of a debtor’s
condition, in an undue hardship case, should be sufficient to strike a chord of pity in the heart of
equity.”).
108. See Cloud, supra note 26, at 797.
109. See Smith, supra note 6, at 632–33; Jennifer Frattini, Comment, The Dischargeability of
Student Loans: An Undue Burden?, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 537, 572 (2001).
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consideration of other facts and circumstances.”110
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VARIOUS STANDARDS
Now that the various tests have been outlined, this Part will analyze
the various ingredients that have been used in these tests. Up to this
point, the courts have attempted to concoct the perfect recipe that
balances both the needs of unfortunate debtors and the stability of the
federal student loan program. The relevant factors include 1) the poverty
level/minimal living standard with the “additional circumstances” test, 2)
the good faith standard, 3) the motivation standard, and 4) the totality of
the circumstances approach. As stated, this Comment proposes a
modified test based on the Brunner test.
A. Living Standard: Analysis of Income and Expenses
Virtually all courts have accepted that the determination of the
debtor’s income relative to the minimal living standard is a necessary
element of the analysis.111 First, the Bankruptcy Commission that
initially recommended the inclusion of § 523(a)(8) expressly referenced
the requirement that debtors show that repayment of the debt will prevent
the debtor from maintaining a minimal living standard.112 The Ninth
Circuit has interpreted the first element in this way:
To meet this requirement, the debtor must demonstrate more than
simply tight finances. In defining undue hardship, courts require more
than temporary financial adversity, but typically stop short of utter
hopelessness. The proper inquiry is whether it would be
“unconscionable” to require the debtor to take steps to earn more
income or reduce her expenses.113

In other words, the debtor need not show that she is in poverty, but
mere financial difficulty is not enough. Under the Ninth Circuit
interpretation, the court is free to make an individualized analysis of the
debtor’s income and expenses and may also consider past fluctuations in
income to produce an accurate picture of the debtor’s real financial

110. Smith, supra note 6, at 633, 635.
111. See, e.g., In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.
1987); In re Bryant, 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Johnson, No. 77-2033 TT, 1979 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11428 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).
112. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 754.
113. In re Birrane, 287 B.R. 490, 495 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (citing In re
Nascimento, 241 B.R. 440, 445 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999)).
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situation.114 However, this interpretation allows courts to “infuse
subjectivity into what should be a straightforward financial
calculation.”115 The main criticism is that this infused subjectivity will
lead to inconsistent results,116 but the results would likely be no more
varied than the results of other types of analyses, such as those of
unconscionability in contract law or reasonableness in tort law. If a
straightforward analysis of income and expenses is what Congress
envisioned, it could have easily included a formula in the Bankruptcy
Code itself that expressly outlined a student debtor’s necessary income
and expense ratio to support an undue hardship exception.117 Instead, it
chose to leave the term undefined, subject to the court’s varied
interpretations. Furthermore, there is no reason to provide predictability
to debtors in this context. The “undue hardship” exception is not a
bankruptcy planning device but rather a situation that Congress believed
should override the general presumption of nondischargeability because
it constitutes an unexpected and unfortunate turn of events.118
The next question is whether the “minimal living standard” is a more
appropriate standard than the strict poverty line standard. In other words,
should debtors have to be utterly impoverished to be eligible for
discharge? The text of § 523(a)(8) states that the debt should not be
discharged “unless excepting such debt . . . would impose an undue
hardship.”119 Importantly, an inquiry into the poverty level is not
necessarily determinative of whether an undue hardship exists. One
could conceive of a situation in which a debtor has an income below the
poverty line, but lived in such conditions that payment of the debt would
not be an “undue hardship,” depending on the amount of the debt.
More likely, however, is the situation where a recent graduate above
the poverty level nonetheless faces undue hardship in meeting her loan
obligations. For instance, if a debtor has an apartment in a large city,
where living expenses are high, and the debtor is carrying a heavy debt,
one could conclude that such a situation constitutes undue hardship if the
debtor’s income is only slightly or moderately above the poverty line. In
these circumstances, the debtor should be entitled to a discharge even

114. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 106, at 197.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 197 n.82.
117. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), 707(b) (2006). Congress had no qualms about
providing rigid formulaic calculations in the Code as part of the 2005 BAPCPA.
118. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 138 (1977).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
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though her income is above the poverty line. Thus, the poverty line can
become a poor and overly rigid indicator of “undue hardship.”
The “additional circumstances” or “certainty of hopelessness”
standard is an outgrowth of the minimal living standard, in that the
additional circumstances test asks whether the debtor’s current financial
condition will continue throughout the repayment period.120 In this way,
the minimal living standard actually consists of two parts: an analysis of
the current situation followed by an analysis of whether that situation
will continue. In the Brunner test, the additional circumstances test is not
dependent on the court’s findings under the good faith test discussed
below.121
But should this element be necessary for determining “undue
hardship?” The answer is yes, because without consideration of
“additional circumstances,” a debtor who anticipates inheriting a large
sum of money, but who is unemployed (i.e., below the minimal living
standard) would be able to qualify for an undue hardship discharge
without having to show actual undue hardship, assuming that he has
made good faith efforts to pay the debt. Thus, courts must consider, and
even require, a continued inability to repay because of additional
circumstances. The problem with the “additional circumstances” test is
that the debtor faces a difficult task of producing sufficient evidence
necessary to show such circumstances.122 Generally, even if the debtor
succeeds in showing a current inability to repay, courts will not presume
that such a financial condition will continue into the future, and so the
burden remains on the debtor to prove additional circumstances.123 As a
result, the court in the case of In re Nys reasoned that this rule would
prevent a debtor from purposely choosing circumstances that prevent
him or her from repaying.124 For these reasons, the “additional
circumstances” element is responsible for incurring the most criticism of

120. In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
121. See id. (“There is no specific authority for this requirement, but the need for some
showing of this type may be inferred from comments of the Commission report.”).
122. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 106, at 198.
123. See In re Nys, 446 F.3d 938, 946 n.7 (9th Cir. 2006) (“By ‘additional circumstances’ or
‘exceptional circumstances’ we mean only that the debtor must present something more than her
current financial situation. In other words, she cannot rely on the fact that if she made payments now
on her student loans, she would not be able to maintain a minimal standard of living. Rather, she
must present the court with circumstances that she cannot reasonably change. To prove ‘undue
hardship,’ the circumstances must indicate that the debtor cannot reasonably be expected to increase
her income and make payments for a substantial portion of the loan’s repayment period.”).
124. Id.
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the Brunner test.125 The primary problem with this test is that proving
“additional circumstances” is highly difficult as it requires the production
of expert testimony showing, for example, a physical or mental
disability, incapacity to work for long periods of time, inability to stay
committed to a single line of work, etc.126 The litigation costs for the
debtor can accordingly skyrocket in trying to prove this one element.
However, the main problem with the Brunner approach is that
satisfying the first element, because it initially establishes that the
debtor’s income is below the level needed to maintain a “minimal
standard of living,” undermines the debtor’s ability to satisfy the second
element. Thus, these two tests (the “minimal living standard” and the
“additional circumstances” tests) are self-contradictory when applied,
because satisfaction of the first element provides evidence that the debtor
failed the second element. The first two elements of the Brunner test,
therefore, have the effect of allowing discharge for only a few select
debtors. When applied, the test allows fewer still. Although Congress
intended only a few particular kinds of debtors to qualify for an “undue
hardship” discharge, the rule in its application achieves this result in the
wrong way. It essentially means that if a student debtor’s “additional
circumstances” happen to be psychological in nature, as opposed to
something more easily provable such as permanent paralysis, then by this
fact alone the psychologically impaired debtor will generally receive
harsher treatment.127 Congress intended the results to be harsh, not
arbitrary and capricious, and so courts should use a different test that
avoids this problem.
The simplest way to avoid the self-contradiction of these first two
prongs would be to shift the burden of proof of “additional
circumstances” to the bankruptcy trustee, or whoever is claiming that the
student debt should not be discharged. If the debtor is able to show that
his current situation is such that he could not pay off the loan while
maintaining a minimal standard of living, then the debtor should be
entitled to a presumption that his situation will continue. This
presumption could then be rebutted by a showing through a
125. See Smith, supra note 6, at 615; Huey, supra note 5, at 115–18.
126. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 106, at 198–99 (citing In re Nys, 446 F.3d at 946).
127. Compare In re Daugherty, 175 B.R. 953, 959–60 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1994) (holding that
the debtor was not entitled to a discharge because although she had mental and physical conditions
creating substantial medical bills, the debtor failed to prove that her medical condition prevented her
from working to repay the loan), with In re Hinkle, 200 B.R. 690, 693–94 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1996) (holding that a debtor whose expenses included medical bills was entitled to a discharge
because she was an older woman with few prospects for increased earning capacity).

839

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/31/2013 3:50 PM

2011

preponderance of the evidence that the debtor’s situation is likely to
change, or that there are no “additional circumstances” that would
prevent the debtor from being able to repay in the future. This would cast
the responsibility of producing expensive expert testimony on the party
that typically has the greater ability to fund the litigation, while at the
same time avoiding the “draconian application” of Brunner.128 Making
this change would provide a more equitable solution to the debtor’s
situation.
However, some argue that this solution does not solve the problem
identified by the court in In re Nys, where a debtor could choose a
lifestyle that would prevent her from repaying the debt.129 But with the
third element of the Brunner test, this problem is avoided.130 If a debtor
intentionally places himself in a situation where repayment becomes
impossible, then the debtor would fail to show that he has made good
faith efforts to repay the loan. Therefore, there is no reason why courts
should not presume a future inability to repay when the debtor succeeds
in showing both a good faith effort and a current inability to repay.
Consequently, courts should keep the “minimal standard of living” test,
but the debtor should not have the burden of producing evidence, such as
expert testimony, to prove that “additional circumstances” exist.
Furthermore, one element that no court seems to have considered in
this analysis is the element of reasonable foreseeability. In the “undue
hardship” analysis, congressional intent almost begs the courts to ask
whether the current predicament of the debtor is a situation that the
debtor should have reasonably foreseen before acquiring the loan. If it
was, then the debtor should be held responsible for the risk of his
decision. Of course, arguably all students enter into a program with the
hopes of at least a moderate income and, in that way, almost never
foresee the risk. Conversely, mere foreseeability may allow courts to
include too many student debtors since attending college is no guarantee
of any employment. Hence, courts might ask whether, under the debtor’s
circumstances, there was any foreseeable way the debtor could have
expected to repay the loan. If not, then the implication is that the student
negligently assumed the debt without properly considering the risks
involved. In one other section of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress
provides a path to discharge if the “debtor’s failure to complete such

128. See Huey, supra note 5, at 115–16.
129. In re Nys, 446 F.3d at 946.
130. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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payments is due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly
be held accountable.”131 This provision has been informally nicknamed
the “hardship discharge” in Chapter 13 cases.132 This may be why the
Brunner court noted that Congress intended not a “garden-variety
‘hardship,’”133 but a hardship that was unexpected.
B. Good Faith Effort to Repay
The good faith standard is a necessary element for undue hardship
analysis, but it can also serve the additional purpose of assessing the
“additional circumstances” requirement. In the previous section, it was
shown that the “additional circumstances” test produces unfair results
when applied in many situations. The good faith standard is an indirect
way of assessing those “additional circumstances” without expressly
testing them and therefore requiring the debtor to produce the necessary
evidence to prove such “additional circumstances.” Take, for instance,
Debbie Debtor, a recent graduate of law school. She has incurred
$130,000 of educational loans but was involved in an accident where she
suffered a head injury that prevents her from concentrating for any
significant amount of time. She also now suffers from migraine
headaches that further prevent prolonged concentration. While she was
able to secure a job with a small law firm for a few months, it became
clear that she would not be able to last there because of her physical
condition. Under the “additional circumstances” test, Debbie would have
to prove that her condition prevents her from working, possibly requiring
the production of a doctor’s testimony, in addition to lay witnesses from
the law firm who can testify to Debbie’s condition. The litigation process
would likely involve substantial discovery and a lengthy trial, even
though Debbie has no way to pay the legal fees.
The good faith standard requires only two things of Debbie. First,
she must use her efforts to maximize her income and minimize expenses.
Likely, she will apply for other jobs, send out resumes, and possibly
obtain employment in a less demanding field. But at the end of the day,
she will only have to produce the applications she has sent to prospective
employers, along with a financial statement of her income and expenses.
All the court needs to ask is, “Did Debbie make a good faith effort to
maximize employment, including finding employment, and minimize

131. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1) (2006).
132. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 430–431 (1977).
133. In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
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expenses?” Under these facts, the court should grant her a discharge for
“undue hardship.” The fact that she has made diligent efforts to apply for
employment and has been unable to hold a job because of her condition
is an indirect way of showing that she will probably not be able to find
the kind of employment that will allow her to pay off such a large debt.
The good faith standard would also encompass all possible methods that
Debbie could use to defer, adjust, consolidate, or otherwise modify the
debt outside of bankruptcy. Because of the extensive programs under
federal law that allow debtors to deal with overbearing debt, the debtor
should have the duty to seek out all possible remedies before resorting to
bankruptcy.
Recall that remedies such as an income-contingent repayment plan
may exist outside of bankruptcy. Creditors have argued that if the debtor
has not applied for such a program, this could be grounds for a finding
that the debtor has not made good faith efforts to repay the loan.134
Collier on Bankruptcy states, however, that “[t]hese arguments overstate
the role that an income-contingent repayment plan should play in
determining dischargeability.”135 In other words, the fact that the debtor
has other options, such as an income-contingent repayment plan, should
not be a per se basis for a finding that the debtor has failed to make good
faith efforts to repay the loan as it could unfairly prejudice the debtor.136
The reason this prejudice may exist is that the debtor would have to be
below the poverty line in order to qualify for the income-contingent
repayment plan, which is a different and harsher requirement than the
“minimal living standard” test.137 Therefore, as a rule, the fact that the
debtor has failed to take advantage of an income-contingent repayment
plan should only be a factor in this analysis and not determinative.138
C. Motivation Standard
To review, the motivation standard requires the court to ask whether
the debtor’s purpose in filing bankruptcy was primarily to eliminate his
134. See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 292 B.R. 635 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003).
135. 4-523 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.14 (3d ed. Rev. 2011) (“The U.S. Department of
Education regulations provide that under an income-contingent repayment plan, a debtor is obliged
to make some payment once the debtor's income exceeds the federal poverty level. However, the
federal poverty level is below a ‘minimal’ standard of living.”).
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See id. (“Courts must also be careful not to treat the enactment of the statute authorizing
the U.S. Department of Education to accept an income-contingent repayment plan as an implied
repeal of section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
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student debt. This standard is therefore logically inconsistent with the
bankruptcy system as explained by the court in In re Bryant. That court
correctly reasoned that the main purpose of debtors in bankruptcy is to
eliminate debt. Thus, it should not be a surprise that a student might race
to the bankruptcy court to rid himself of a large educational loan. As a
result, the only time this standard will be utilized is if a bankruptcy
trustee or the government could prove that the debtor had the actual
intention of declaring bankruptcy before his situation became dire.
Because this situation is extraordinarily rare, as a general rule, the
motivation standard is often irrelevant.
D. Totality of the Circumstances
As the name suggests, a true “totality of the circumstances test”
inherently contemplates a potentially infinite number of factors that
could affect a student debtor’s ability to repay a debt.139 There are many
problems with this test as a result. First, it is overly broad. For example,
one factor that should be dismissed from consideration in an “undue
hardship” analysis is the value of the degree that the debtor holds.140
Although the value of higher education is on the decline, the value of
one’s degree should never come into undue hardship analysis because the
kind of degree a debtor chooses to pursue is a conscious decision that the
debtor makes before schooling begins. As a result, the debtor should be
the one to bear the costs of her decision to enter a particular field with a
certain amount of debt. This is particularly true when the specific field
bears little promise of significant future earnings, or the program or
school attended has not been accredited by the appropriate authority.
Additionally, allowing more debtors to claim undue hardship
because of an unprofitable degree may encourage more students to take
on educational debt with the intention of relying on the safety net of

139. See Smith, supra note 6, at 632.
140. See id. The totality of the circumstances test proposed by Smith would include
consideration of good faith filing. In one case applying the Johnson test, the court stated that the
mechanical test should be applied, followed by a consideration of good faith,
“including whether the debtor has made a bona fide attempt to repay the loan, and
whether the debtor was negligent or irresponsible in conducting his financial affairs such
that the debtor's misfortune is self-imposed and the conclusion drawn under the
mechanical test should be altered. Lastly, if bad faith is found, there must be a
presumption against discharge which can be rebutted only by finding that the debtor’s
dominant reason for filing was not eradication of substantial student loans and that the
debtor has not benefited financially from the education financed by the loan.”
In re Briscoe, 16 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (emphasis added).
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bankruptcy in the future. Granted, in 1997 the Bankruptcy Commission
found that the likelihood of bankruptcy abuse by student debtors was
small, concluding that § 523(a)(8) should be repealed.141 However,
although individual student debtors may not flock to bankruptcy in large
numbers after a repeal of the undue hardship exception, for-profit
institutions may use the repeal of § 523(a)(8) to attract more students,
encouraging them to take on enormous amounts of debt while assuring
them that doing so bears minimal risk. The enrollment practices of forprofit universities often are questionable at best, and fraudulent or highly
deceptive at worst. In an undercover study, the GAO recently reported
that enrollment officers at for-profit universities have often engaged in
hard-sell sales and marketing techniques while withholding financial aid
advice in order to push prospective students into enrollment.142 One
representative told an undercover applicant that he should not worry
about repaying his student loans because “no one will come after you if
you don’t pay.”143 Another representative told an applicant that he
personally had over $85,000 of student debt, but that he had no intention
of repaying it.144 It seems likely that if the undue hardship exception is
repealed or interpreted broadly to encompass a larger number of student
debtors, for-profit institutions could capitalize on such a change in order
to boost their enrollment as well as their tuition. This demonstrates that
in the context of “undue hardship” analysis the courts should not
consider all conceivable factors.
The congressional intent behind § 523(a)(8) suggests that a narrow
test should be used instead of a broad or all-encompassing test.145 In
addition to the reasons previously listed, consider the text of § 523(a)(8)
stating “undue hardship.” The court in Brunner correctly noted that
Congress obviously did not contemplate a broad definition of “undue
hardship,” but that the “existence of the adjective ‘undue’ indicates that
Congress viewed garden-variety hardship as an insufficient excuse for a
discharge of student loans.”146
Finally, the test does not provide uniform results in the student
141. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 213–16
(1997).
142. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES:
UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND
QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 11–12 (2010).
143. Id. at 12.
144. Id.
145. See discussion supra Part II.C.
146. In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
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debtor context. The test is of course flexible, but this perceived benefit
could end up being a curse rather than a blessing, as different courts
would apply the test differently, leading to unpredictable and inconsistent
results.147 “Under the current standard, however, courts may choose
from a multitude of factors and apply any combination of them to a given
case, which only adds to the ambiguity and complexity of determining
what constitutes undue hardship.”148 In other words, even though a court
is directed to consider all factors equally, the court may still take the
Orwellian approach of treating some factors more equally than others.
For instance, one court may treat a debtor’s situation differently by
focusing more on the current and future ability to repay, while others
may
emphasize
the
good
faith element. This varying treatment could lead to forum shopping,
inconsistent results, and a lack of guidance to student debtors.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the plain language and the congressional intent behind §
523(a)(8), the Brunner test provides the best foundation for “undue
hardship” analysis because it provides a simple and straightforward
three-step analysis that is strict but predictable. However, the Brunner
test should be modified so that the burden of proof regarding the
“additional circumstances” is not on the debtor, but on the party claiming
nondischargeability. This presumption can be overcome by a showing
that the debtor’s situation could possibly change or is not permanent. But
whatever test is used, it should be as strict as Congress originally
intended it to be. It should not matter that Congress may have been
motivated by a perceived rather than an actual abuse of the system.
Perhaps the mere possibility of abuse is enough to warrant the differing
treatment. Those who oppose § 523(a)(8) will likely achieve their
desired results more quickly if the bankruptcy courts adopt a draconian
application of the “undue hardship” exception, thereby forcing Congress
to deal with the results that follow.
Moreover, there were and are rational policy considerations that
support the continued application of § 523(a)(8), even in a strict form.
The “fresh start” policy is not a constitutional requirement; rather it is
merely a general framework that has emerged from the conglomeration
of provisions that Congress has adopted over the years. Judges, as well as
147. Huey, supra note 5, at 108.
148. Frattini, supra note 109, at 566.
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scholars in particular, must realize that there is more at stake than mere
logical consistency. Relieving a debtor of student loans under the banner
of “fresh start” is not the end of the analysis: someone is going to have to
foot the bill, whether it is the taxpayers, fellow student borrowers, or the
debtor who incurs the loss.
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